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Medical Data, New Information Technologies and the Need for Normative 









Recent technological developments invite us to reconsider our traditional conceptions of 
privacy and to extend the normative framework for the moral and legal assessment of 
new information technologies. I will propose a new account of the conceptualisation of 
privacy and I will introduce some additional normative principles, which – taken together 
– are better fit to capture the social problems relating to certain technologies. The 
technologies on which I will focus are those of profiling through data mining, especially 
profiling through data mining in epidemiology. 
In the years to come, profiling through data mining will become an important and 
powerful set of techniques in the hands of epidemiologists and policymakers in the field 
of health care. The techniques of data mining will enable them to predict the 
developments in the health condition and health risks of populations more accurately and, 
more importantly, much easier than ever before. Applying the techniques results in 
generalisations about groups of persons, rather than about individuals. For this reason, 
existing privacy norms do not apply. Nevertheless, some of the ways in which these 
generalisations are used or can be used may lead to serious social and moral problems. In 
this paper, I will first present some preliminaries about profiling through data mining. 
Next, I will explain in some detail why current conceptions of privacy, as they occur in 
law, legal theory and ethics, are too weak as to their normative and descriptive evaluation 
and distinction potential to capture the problems relating to profiling through data 
mining. Subsequently, I will propose a new conceptual scheme for the privacy notion. 
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This approach equips us with a better understanding of the descriptive core and the basic 
points of the value notion. In addition, it enables us to understand and articulate the 
problems arising in relation to profiling through data mining that cannot be adequately 
and completely formulated in terms of other evaluative notions and principles. 
Nevertheless, invoking these additional principles and values is necessary. I will expound 
the ones needed to extend the normative framework for assessing information 
technologies. Finally, I will put forward and discuss some practical solutions to the 
problems at issue. 
 
2.  Profiling through data mining 
 
'Data mining' is the term I use to refer to the whole set of techniques certain experts call 
'knowledge discovery in databases (KDD)'. This set of techniques is applied in a process 
that is traditionally divided into three phases, i.e. the data warehousing phase, the data 
mining phase proper and the interpretation phase. In the data-warehousing phase, data is 
collected, enriched, checked, and coded. The data is analysed in what the aforementioned 
experts call the data-mining phase in the strict sense. Finally, the results are interpreted. 
During these phases, a search hypothesis is used to guide the process.2 In this paper, I 
will use the perhaps somewhat sloppy language that has become customary, and not 
restrict the use of  'data mining' to refer to the middle phase of the KDD process only.  
 The basic aims and greatest opportunities of data mining are description and 
prediction through the discovery of significant patterns in the relationships of whatever 
kind between data.3 By 'profiling through data mining', I refer to those data-mining 
processes that result in profiles of groups of persons, i.e. characterisations of groups that 
can be assigned to those groups and to the members of those groups. The process of 
profiling through data mining aims at tracking down significant relationships between 
characteristics that define and identify a group of persons on the one hand and whatever 
properties or characteristics on the other.   
 In recent years, profiling through data mining has been acknowledged as an important 
set of techniques in analysing data for purposes such as direct marketing and credit 
scoring. Other applications include checking for patterns in criminal behaviour for 
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forensic and judicial purposes and defining high-risk groups for tax evasion in order to 
improve rateability. A very inviting and – at least from the perspectives of public interest 
and public health – very useful utilisation is analysing medical data or data about the use 
of medical services in combination with demographic data for epidemiological purposes. 
So, for instance, data about the use of medical services in the files and databases of 
health-insurance companies, or data from medical files or electronic care records 
maintained by health-care providers, could be merged and analysed. These analyses can 
result in the description and prediction of the incidence and prevalence of diseases. They 
also enable epidemiologists to ascertain and find high-risk groups, and to determine 
relations between chances of recovery from diseases and other – until now as yet 
unknown – influencing factors, etc.  
It is primarily the utilisation for epidemiological or public health purposes I will 
be concerned with here. I will not go into the details of these specific applications. Much 
of what I will say equally applies to profiling through data mining for other purposes – be 
they fiscal, judicial, or commercial. One of the reasons to select data mining and profiling 
for epidemiological purposes is that it is a salient example of applying the techniques for 
undoubtedly good and legitimate primary purposes, while many of the secondary uses of 
the resulting profiles may turn out to be highly questionable. 
Throughout this paper, I will treat of profiling and data mining only insofar as it 
involves the use of personal medical data in the so-called 'warehousing phase'. Personal 
medical data is personal data directly or indirectly  – e.g. via data concerning the use of 
medical services and medication – referring to health condition and health prospect. Of 
course, I will include profiling through data mining insofar as it involves the use of 
medical personal data in combination with other data, be it personal or of another kind. I 
will, however, not address profiling through data mining involving no personal data at all.  
 
3. Current conceptions of privacy 
 
For an understanding of present-day conceptions of privacy, some acquaintance with the 
legal notion of privacy is necessary, especially with what might be called the legal 
conception of informational privacy. Over the last decades, informational privacy has 
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become more and more important in law and regulation. Informational privacy in law and 
regulation is mostly interpreted as data protection. There is one kind of data that is 
considered exclusively eligible for protection by privacy law and regulation: personal 
data. Personal data is commonly defined as data and information relating to an identified 
or identifiable person. A clear illustration of this rather narrow starting point can be found 
in the highly influential European Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the European Council of 24 October 1995 'on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data'. The Directive 
poses some basic principles with regard to the processing of personal data. As might be 
expected from the definition of 'personal data', most of these principles lean heavily on 
the idea that there is some kind of direct connection between a particular person and his 
or her data. 
First, there are some principles regarding data quality. Personal data should only 
be collected for specified, explicit, legitimate purposes and should not be further 
processed in a way incompatible with these purposes. No excessive amounts of data 
should be collected, relative to the purpose for which the data is collected. Moreover, the 
data should be accurate and, if applicable, kept up to date. It must be guaranteed that 
inaccurate or incomplete data is either rectified or erased. Also, personal data should be 
kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purpose for which the data was collected. 
Second, some principles apply to the processing of personal data. Data processing 
is legitimate if an individual has unambiguously given his or her consent. Furthermore, 
processing may be legitimate if the processing is needed for compliance with a legal 
obligation, for the protection of vital interests of the data subject, for some public 
interests, or for some legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by third parties 
to whom the data is disclosed. 
Third, the data subject has some specific rights with regard to 'his or her' personal 
data.  Among these rights are the right of  knowing what data is being stored and  
whether the data relating to the data subject is being processed, the right of rectification, 
the right to know to whom the data has been disclosed, and the right to object to the 
processing of data relating to the data subject.  
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The definitions and principles formulated in the European Directive are 
implemented in the national privacy laws and regulations of the European Union member 
states. For this reason, the impact of the Directive’s definition and principles should not 
be underestimated. 
The conceptual and normative individualism of the Directive reflects ideas about 
informational privacy currently held amongst legal and ethical theorists.4 Sometimes, 
these ideas on informational privacy are not much more than implicit assumptions. 
However, things are different and more articulate where theorists define privacy as being 
in control over (the accessibility of) personal information, or where they indicate some 
kind of personal freedom, such as the preference freedom in the vein of John Stuart 
Mill’s individuality, as the ultimate point and key value behind privacy.5 These theorists 
consider privacy to be mainly concerned with information relating to individual persons. 
They also tend to advocate protective measures in terms of safeguarding an individual’s 
control and consent vis-à-vis certain dispersions of personal information. 
 Applying the narrow definition of personal data and protective measures such as the 
Directive’s and some philosophers’ to the profiles discussed here is problematic. As long 
as the process involves personal data in the strict sense of data relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual, the definition and the principles apply without reservation. This 
will mainly concern some of the source material in the so-called warehousing phase of 
data mining. However, as soon as the data has ceased to be personal data in the strict 
sense, it is not at all clear how the principles should be applied. For instance, the right of 
rectification applies to the personal data in the strict sense; it does not apply to 
information derived from this data. The same goes for the requirement of consent. Once 
the data has become anonymous, or has been processed and generalised,  an individual 
cannot exert any influence on the processing of the data at all. In sum, the definition and 
the rights and requirements – at least as they are traditionally formulated and interpreted 
– make no sense regarding anonymous data and group profiles.  
 Before I can elaborate further on this problem, it seems advisable to have a closer 
look at current conceptions of privacy in the legal and ethical debate over the last 
decades. Doing so will enable us to be more accurate when dealing more specifically 
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with the normative and descriptive evaluation and distinction potential of the notion of 
privacy. 
 In the last decades, there has been ample discussion on the subject of privacy, 
particularly on the descriptive and normative aspects of the notion. One line of discussion 
has focused on the normative political problem of the (right to) privacy of citizens versus 
the duty of government or those same citizens to serve the public interest or the common 
good.6 The conception of privacy that played a part in this environment could perhaps be 
best characterised as a conception of decisional privacy or an autonomy conception of 
privacy. The debate concentrated on the political question of how much liberty should be 
granted to an individual regarding his or her intimate personal domain, particularly 
concerning his or her sexual orientation, the use of contraceptives, abortion, etc. In this 
approach, privacy boils down to a kind of personal freedom within a restricted area. 
 Other discussions ran along the borders of the partially overlapping fields of 
semantics, epistemology and value theory. So, for instance, there has been discussion on 
the role of conventions, traditions and the total network of social practices in a given 
culture regarding the identification of spheres of life or aspects of persons which are 
called private or personal.7 Other debates have been concerned with the question whether 
the right to privacy could be derived from the autonomy of individual persons or be better 
interpreted as protective of certain kinds of interests of individuals. There have been 
debates about the question whether privacy was concerned with the inaccessibility of 
personal spheres as such or rather with an individual's control over the access to his or 
her personal sphere. Again others have been about the question whether privacy is just 
about physical accessibility of personal spheres or about access to information about an 
individual's personal sphere as well. In this debate, the information approach, with a 
conception of privacy as informational privacy in its wake, remained dominant.8 
 Furthermore, important work has been done explicitly on the normative point of 
privacy. Fried and Rachels situated the point of privacy norms in respect for the need of 
individuals to be able to control the spread of information about their personal spheres in 
order to define the character of relationships which they (would like to) establish and 
maintain with other individuals and institutions.9  In addition to this, Deborah Johnson 
emphasised privacy's empowering role. Privacy as control over personal information is 
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an important instrument to strengthen the position of citizens and consumers vis-à-vis 
governmental institutions and private organisations.10 Stanley Benn and Jeffrey Johnson 
highlighted the possibilities, offered by privacy norms, to be immune from the judgement 
of others and to be respected as a (now and then erring and failing) plan-making and 
plan-implementing being, instead of an object without will, ready to be fixed and pinned 
down in the judgement of others.11 
 
4. Privacy: A contextual-functional approach 
 
Although privacy is an often and easily used notion, its precise meaning is far from clear, 
and liable to stimulate controversies.12 In order to avoid digressions, I will stipulate an 
account of the meaning of privacy.  This account serves two purposes. First, it indicates a 
defensible unifying core concept that is common to most of the conceptions of privacy 
currently used. Together with some broader considerations concerning the contextuality 
and functionality of meaning in the account, the core concept enables us to clarify and 
systematise the seemingly diffuse and chaotic family of privacy conceptions. Second, the 
account of privacy put forward will help to understand and articulate the problems in 
relation to profiling and data mining that cannot be formulated adequately and completely 
in terms of other evaluative notions and principles.13 
 My account of privacy leans heavily on Jeffrey Johnson's conception of privacy as 
'immunity from the judgements of others'. I think that Johnson is right in assuming that 
the idea of immunity from the judgement of others is in some way or other the trait 
d'union between all the instantiations of privacy. The way in which it performs the 
function of this unifying feature is important. Unfortunately, Johnson is not very clear 
about this. I would say that we are in fact talking about two levels: the level of the 
phenomena in which privacy is instantiated and the level of language in which these 
instantiations are articulated. I would claim that apart from all other characteristics that 
may be present, common to most of the phenomena in which privacy is instantiated is the 
feature of an individual's immunity from the judgement of others (as being present or as 
being absent). At the level of linguistic articulations or propositional renderings of 
instantiations of privacy, I would say that the absence or presence of immunity from the 
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judgement of others is the basic description frame common to the correct articulations of 
all possible instantiations of privacy. By calling the individual's immunity from the 
judgement of others a basic description frame, I mean that in the articulations of 
instantiations of privacy, somehow a positive or negative account of a description of this 
immunity to the judgement of others is present or at least presupposed. 
 The feature of immunity to the judgement of others can be found in most 
instantiations of privacy – with the important exception of decisional privacy, but to this 
issue, I will return later. Privacy is often rightfully considered as the condition of an 
individual in which others do not have access to his or her personal sphere as such or 
without the individual's permission. 'Having access', however, should be understood as 
being near to or present in an individual's personal sphere. This nearness or presence may 
be physical (with one's body) or instrumental (by bugging, using binoculars, etc.), or by 
apprehending information that has already been abstracted by oneself or by others from 
an individual's personal sphere. A common feature of all these variations of access is that 
another person or other persons become informed about certain aspects of the individual's 
personal sphere. Through this information, others are enabled to judge and evaluate the 
person in some respect. A person's privacy is being directly infringed when others have 
physical or instrumental access to his or her personal sphere, thereby gathering 
information without permission. A journalist infringes on the privacy of a person, for 
instance, if he or she uninvitedly intrudes into the person's home and takes a picture of 
this person while he or she is asleep. Furthermore, the journalist infringes on this person's 
privacy indirectly by publishing the photograph in a newspaper to inform the readers 
about the person's personal sphere. The readers who are thus informed, infringe on this 
person's privacy directly, albeit possibly non-voluntarily. 
 This articulates sufficiently the basic description frame of privacy. The basic 
description frame is the common denominator of privacy conceptions. The normative 
point for (the importance of) articulating problems and problematic situations in terms of 
privacy and for valuing privacy is a different subject. It is to be found in a complex 
amalgam and interplay of contextual elements and different values, and not only, as 
Johnson would have it, in conventions, on the one hand, and freedom or autonomy, on 
the other.  
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 Why is it important to protect or to safeguard the immunity of persons from the 
judgement of others? Why is infringing on privacy, why is compromising this immunity, 
a serious thing to do? Many writers have suggested that there is one value or one set of 
some familiar values at issue for which the value of privacy is instrumental or 
constitutive. This single value or small set of familiar values is thought to underlie all 
instantiations of privacy. Johnson has suggested that personal freedom is behind privacy. 
Benn suggested that we are dealing with specific kinds of freedom: the freedom of self-
presentation and moral autonomy. Again others have put forward other connected values. 
Interestingly enough, they all seek the unifying factor of the apparent diversity of privacy 
conceptions in a single or in some familiar values that are thought to be behind privacy. 
A possible reason for this is that they have all been trying to find the conceptual link 
between decisional privacy and privacy in terms of access or information via some 
common underlying value that was supposed to bridge the gap between these notions.  
 The unity of privacy, however, is not to be sought in the value(s) behind privacy, but 
precisely in what I have called the basic description-frame. This should not lead us to 
underestimate the importance of all the different values, associated with privacy. Let me 
start to clarify this point by commenting on Jeffrey Johnson's view that conventions 
determine what is to be considered the personal sphere, the domain supposed to be 
protected by privacy:  
  'Privacy is a conventional concept. What is considered private is socially or 
culturally defined. It varies from context to context, it is dynamic, and it is quite possible 
that no single example can be found of something which is considered private in every 
culture. Nevertheless, all examples of privacy have a single common feature. They are 
aspects of a person’s life which are culturally recognised as being immune from the 
judgement of others.... The function of privacy, therefore, is to isolate certain limited and 
culturally defined aspects of the individual’s life as being morally and legally protected 
from the evaluative judgement of others.'14 
 By an individual's personal sphere we usually mean the domain of a person, 
consisting of his mind and body, possessions, letters, home, certain activities, etc. It 
should be kept in mind that the notion of personal sphere is originally a metaphor. It 
should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of spatial dimensions or territory. The 
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personal sphere also includes aspects and dimensions of persons, lives and actions, as 
seen from certain perspectives. Jeffrey Johnson is right in claiming that what is 
considered to belong to the personal sphere is in several respects defined by the 
conventions and traditions of one's culture and community. One should not, however, feel 
tempted to equate conventions and traditions too hastily with either arbitrary tendencies 
or with purely contingent social arrangements. In many cases, conventions are only part 
of the story. The rationale for including certain elements in the personal sphere (e.g. 
nudity of the body, the performance of certain biological functions) in a Western 
community nowadays seems sometimes hard to find. Nevertheless, for some of these 
there certainly has been a reason and for most of the others there certainly have been 
good reasons to count them as belonging to the personal sphere.  
 Conventions also play a part in combination with the prevention of harm and offence, 
or some conception of individual well-being. The point of defining certain items or 
aspects of persons as 'personal' often lies in the fact that persons with respect to these 
items and aspects just tend to be vulnerable, and are therefore in need of protection. 
Conventions and traditions are important in the definition of the personal sphere to the 
extent that they themselves or the social arrangements accompanying them create or keep 
up the conditions and occasions for special kinds of harm or offence. So, for instance, 
one's medical condition and prospects are rightfully considered to belong to the personal 
sphere. There is a certain tradition, convention or at least a seemingly ineradicable 
tendency in Western societies towards harmful discrimination and stigmatisation of and 
scorn for the ill and the suffering. Although this tendency is mostly suppressed, it 
sometimes comes to head in the rejection of persons with certain diseases. Recent 
examples are AIDS and other communicable diseases. 
 Conventional aspects of privacy like these are unfortunately rarely acknowledged by 
contemporary scholars, impressed as they are by the apparent irrationality of some 
conventions designating certain features as belonging to the personal domain. The 
scholars who do have an open eye for conventions are a little fuzzy about the precise role 
of conventions. So, for instance, it is not in the least clear whether Jeffrey Johnson, when 
talking about the conventional aspects of privacy, envisages the aspects which I have 
distinguished above. He may as well be making a statement about the development of the 
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value of privacy in the traditions of a community when he wrote the passage quoted 
above.  
 Both these interpretations are important to privacy, but they should not be confused. 
They explain part of the constitution of the personal sphere and part of the constitution of 
the value of privacy. Conventions determine in part under which aspect or from which 
perspective the disclosure of a feature of a person or a person's life might hurt or harm 
this person. These features – and these not necessarily per se but under a certain aspect or 
in a certain perspective – are part of the personal sphere. They explain indirectly why 
such disclosure would be bad: the person would be hurt or harmed because of the stigma, 
taboo, prejudice or (social) exclusion that is in the normal course of events in a society or 
culture like the one involved attached to such disclosure. The value which in such 
situations is to be protected ultimately is the well-being of individuals. It is protected by 
avoiding the possibility that information about persons is disclosed that might harm them 
by exposing them to prejudice, stigmatisation and exclusion, etc. 
 Conventions are not the whole story about the personal sphere. Neither are they – in 
combination with some ideal conception of personal well-being  – the whole normative 
point of privacy. Economic and social arrangements and technical and technological 
developments play their role as well, as do important values other than the one of 
individual well-being. 
 Certain social, economic and technical arrangements – themselves partially based on 
conventions and traditions – provide the opportunity, and sometimes even the 
institutional necessity, to harm persons on the grounds of features of their personal 
sphere, such as their medical condition and prospects. They do so, for instance, by 
hindering access to insurance, credit facilities, jobs and offices, some of the few social 
institutions in which discrimination on the grounds of health aspects of persons is still 
accepted in Western societies and cultures. Here, disclosing information about the health 
condition and prospects of persons is reckoned to be private or belonging to the personal 
sphere because people may be harmed by it in that they are excluded from certain social 
provisions and amenities. Again, an ideal of individual well-being is the normative point 
behind protecting the privacy of individuals in this respect. 
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 In addition to and, often, in combination with conventions, social, economic and 
technical arrangements and the general value individual well-being, other values play 
their part as well. Fried and Rachels have shown that privacy enables individuals to 
control the spread of information about their personal spheres. Fried certainly has a case 
in claiming that privacy is constitutive of friendship and instrumental to veracity. Rachels 
understands the control over the dissemination of personal information as an  important 
constituent of autonomy, enabling persons to define themselves the character of 
relationships which they (choose to) establish or maintain with other individuals and 
institutions. Jeffrey Johnson considers privacy to be a guarantee against the undesired 
evaluative judgement of others and therefore as a constituent of freedom. Benn shows the 
further point of such immunity: abstaining from judgements about an individual’s 
personal sphere allows him,  at least in a certain area, to be respected as a person. 'The 
value of privacy', says Benn, 'hinges on a person's interest in forms of self-presentation, 
as part of his self-awareness as a maker of projects, without which the individual is 
depersonified, reduced to an object.... The ends of privacy rights are derived from the 
needs of human beings to be safe from persecution, to develop intimate personal 
relations, etc.'15 
 The unity in the family of privacy conceptions lies hidden in a common description 
frame, and not in some value or values underlying privacy. There are many values behind 
privacy. For which value privacy exactly functions as an instrument, depends on the 
context of social, economical and technical circumstances and conventions. This is why 
the meaning of privacy is determined by context and function. 
 A potential objection against this account of privacy could be that immunity to the 
judgement of others can be discovered in all instantiations of privacy, with the exception 
of instantiations of decisional privacy. The main thesis of my account is, however, that all 
privacy conceptions have the common feature of using one basic description frame. 
There is a difference between the instantiations of privacy in the phenomena and the 
linguistic articulations of such instantiations of privacy. Immunity to the judgement of 
others is a common basic description frame for all articulations of instantiations of 
privacy; it is not a common feature to all instantiations of privacy in the phenomena. I 
would say that instantiations of 'decisional privacy' as they occur in the phenomena do 
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not share this characteristic. That we label these occurrences privacy phenomena has 
other reasons. The domain of life and actions which decisional privacy or an autonomy 
conception of privacy covers – in the sense that it requires respect for or forbears 
interference with decisions and actions in this domain – is essentially part of the sphere or 
the domain in which persons normally are thought to have immunity from the judgement 
of others. In addition to this, there seem to have been strategic and practical reasons to 
bring the kind of decisions that decisional privacy actually protects under the label of 
privacy. The idea of decisional privacy is strongly associated to a certain interpretation of 
some of the amendments to the American Constitution. The notion of privacy – as 
relating to physical access and information about persons – already played some role in 
the interpretations of these. It lay in the natural course of events that the defendants of 
what I have labelled 'decisional privacy' would turn to the privacy vocabulary. A more 
appropriate juridical linguistic framework just seems to have been missing. Apparently, 
other constitutional starting points were not at hand. Finally, although there might be 
better ways of formulating the instantiations and the general values of decisional privacy, 
convention and custom have kept us from abandoning the conception in favour of a better 
one.  Needless to say, that, although immunity to the judgement of others is not a feature 
of instantiations of decisional privacy, it is a basic description frame of articulations of 
instantiations of decisional privacy because the idea of immunity from the judgement of 
others is conceptually, indirectly, presupposed by the articulation. To put it differently: 
the conception of decisional privacy feeds on the conception of privacy that generally 
articulates instantiations of privacy in which immunity to the judgement of others is at 
issue. 
 In sum: Privacy is a servant of many master values. In addition to the values that have 
been brought to the fore there are still others, such as individuality, fairness in judgement 
and treatment, etc. In the next section, I will show how these values are active behind 
instantiations of privacy. In this section, I have put forward an account of privacy in 
which the basic description frame of  'immunity to the judgement of others' is the 
unifying factor in the family of privacy conceptions. The variety, which I labelled 
decisional privacy, stands somewhat apart from the other varieties because it is only 
indirectly connected to the basic description frame. I have also explained that privacy 
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should not be considered to be derived somehow from just one value or from some 
familiar values. Behind different instantiations of privacy, in different contexts, different 
values may be active, mostly in combination with certain conventions, traditions and 
technical, economic and social-institutional arrangements.  
 
5.  Categorical privacy, individuality, fairness and justice 
 
Most conceptions of individual informational privacy currently put forward in law, 
regulation and ethical debate have one feature in common that is important to my point. 
Not only do they assume that the personal data with which privacy is concerned, orig-
inally consist of statements about states of affairs or aspects accompanied by indicators of 
individual natural persons, they also assume that the data during processing continue to 
contain those identifiers of individual natural persons. This feature of many current 
privacy conceptions has two significant consequences: it makes it difficult to label the 
problematic aspects of using data abstracted from personal data and producing and apply-
ing group profiles and generalisations; it also makes it difficult to fathom the seriousness 
of these problems in practice.  
It should be observed that group profiles and generalisations may occasionally be 
incompatible with respect for individual privacy and laws and regulations regarding the 
protection of personal data, as it is traditionally conceived of. In order to understand this, 
we must distinguish between distributive profiles and non-distributive profiles.  
Distributive profiles assign certain properties to a data or information subject, consisting 
of a group of persons however defined, in such a way that these properties are actually 
and unconditionally manifested by all members of that group. Distributive generalisations 
and profiles are put in the form of down-to-earth, matter-of-fact statements. As opposed 
to this, non-distributive profiles are framed in terms of probabilities and averages and 
medians, significant deviancies from other groups, etc. They are based on comparisons of 
members of the group with each other and/or on comparisons of one particular group 
with other groups. Non-distributive profiles are, therefore, significantly different from 
distributive profiles. The properties in non-distributive generalisations apply to 
individuals as members of the reference group, whereas these individuals taken as such 
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need not in reality exhibit these properties. For instance, an applicant may be refused a 
life insurance on the basis of a non-distributive  generalisation of certain health risks of 
the group (e.g. defined by a postal code) to which he happens to belong, whereas he or 
she is a clear exception to the average risks of his or her group. In all such cases, the 
individual is primarily judged and treated on the basis of belonging to a group or category 
of persons and not on his or her own merits and characteristics. 
Distributive generalisations and profiles may sometimes be rightfully thought of 
as infringements of (individual) privacy when the individuals involved can easily be 
identified through a combination with other information available to the recipient or 
through spontaneous recognition. In the case of non-distributive profiles, the information 
remains attached to an information subject constituted by a group. It cannot be traced 
back to individual persons in any straightforward sense. The groups which are the 
information subjects of non-distributive profiles can often only be identified by those 
who defined them for a special purpose. From the perspectives of people other than the 
producers and certain users of the profiles and generalisations, the definition of the 
information subject will remain hidden because they do not know the specific purposes of 
the definition. When accidentally found out by the people in the reference group, they 
will probably think of the definition as being arbitrarily chosen. Most importantly, 
however, the information contained in the profile envisages individuals as members of 
groups; it does not envisage the individuals as such. Supposing for the sake of argument 
that the profile has been produced in a methodically sound and reliable way, it only tells 
us some truth about individual members of those groups in a very qualified, conditional 
manner. Therefore, privacy rules, as they are traditionally conceived of, do not apply. The 
information in non-distributive profiles cannot be traced back to individual persons. 
One might think that perhaps we could be saved by some notion of collective 
privacy.  However, collective privacy will not do the job properly. The notion of 
collective privacy is too easily associated with the concept of collective rights. The 
subjects of collective rights are groups or communities. In order to make sense of the idea 
of collective rights, these subjects are often treated as beings analogous to persons or 
moral agents, or at least as conglomerates having certain characteristics which cannot 
ultimately and exhaustively be explained by the input of the individual members. 
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Furthermore, they are often thought to be structured or organised in some way so as to be 
able to exercise their rights or let their rights be advocated by vicarious agents.16 All these 
properties do not apply to the reference groups of the profiles we are considering. From 
the perspective of their members, these groups are mostly randomly defined. Their 
members do not have any special ties of loyalty among one another. Nor do they have 
organisational structures. Therefore, they are not able to take decisions or to act as collec-
tivities.  
In order to remove the deficiencies of current conceptions of privacy as regards 
analytical and distinctive evaluative potential, we would be better off utilising a concept, 
which I have elsewhere labelled, 'categorical privacy'.17 I suggest that we conceive of 
categorical privacy not as an independent concept, but as a dimension of privacy. This 
dimension relates to data or information to which the following conditions apply. (1) The 
information was originally taken from the personal sphere of individuals, and – after 
aggregation and processing according to statistical methods – is no longer accompanied 
by identifiers of individual natural persons, but, instead, by identifiers of groups of 
persons. (2) When attached to identifiers of groups and when disclosed, the information 
is apt to carry with it the same kind of negative consequences for the members of those 
groups as it would for an individual natural person if the information were accompanied 
by identifiers of that individual. 
Categorical privacy is strongly connected with individual privacy. It uses the 
same basic description frame as individual privacy, i.e. immunity from the judgement of 
others. The values which – in combination with contextual factors such as conventions 
and social arrangements – oppose infringements on individual privacy, such as individual 
well-being, personal autonomy, individuality and certain social interests, equally oppose 
infringements of categorical privacy. But there are more values at issue, such as fair 
judgement and treatment, and respect for the individuality, i.e. the individual merits and 
characteristics, of persons. Unlike collective privacy, categorical privacy has its points in 
respecting and protecting the individual rather than in respecting and protecting some 
group to which the individual belongs. Furthermore, the conception of categorical 
privacy presented here – just like many current conceptions of individual privacy – builds 
on a conception of the personal sphere that is partially predefined by conventions and 
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social, economic and technical arrangements. Categorical privacy, however, is different 
from its individual counterpart in that it draws attention to the attribution of generalised 
properties to members of groups, which may result in the same effects as the attribution 
of particularised properties to individuals as such. In this respect, infringements of 
categorical privacy resemble stereotyping and wrongful discrimination on the basis of 
stereotypes.18  
We began reconsidering privacy norms by questioning the possibilities of 
profiling through data mining for epidemiological purposes. In section 2, I emphasised 
that many of these applications are undoubtedly very useful. Earlier on, I also stated that 
it might be difficult to come to understand precisely the darker side of these applications, 
the current conceptions of privacy in law, regulation and ethical theory standing in the 
way. By now, things may be a little less complex. Problems accompanying distributive 
profiles may at least in part be articulated in terms of a traditional privacy conception. 
Problems related to non-distributive profiles can be partially articulated in terms of the 
notion of categorical privacy. It is important to see, however, that the significance or 
seriousness of these drawbacks depends heavily on the context in which the profiles are 
used. Suppose that the profiles are produced and used only and strictly for 
epidemiological purposes, in such a way that there are guarantees that access to them is 
only permitted to some researchers who do not pass the information on to others. Against 
this background the privacy objections have a seriousness that is of a rather academic 
kind. Things are different, however, as soon as the guarantees mentioned are absent. 
Then the information in the profiles may become available to others and thus become part 
of the body of public knowledge in society or the information may be used for 
completely other purposes, such as selection procedures for jobs, insurance, loans, etc. Of 
course, if the latter happens, then not only privacy is at stake, but also values of social 
justice and fairness. Social justice is at stake where the distribution of provisions and 
amenities in society is based on health criteria. Fairness is at stake where non-distributive 
profiles as such are used. When such profiles are applied, an individual is judged and 
treated on the basis of characteristics he or she did not acquire voluntarily, such as a bad 
health condition or a bad health prospect. More importantly, however, an individual as 
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such will often not exhibit the characteristic at all, since such a characteristic is one of the 
group and not necessarily also of the individual.  
Medical profiles may carry yet another problem with them. Through data mining 
and profiling, information may be produced about an individual which is unknown to this 
individual. For instance, one may think of a profile indicating a health risk of a group of 
persons, without these persons knowing the risk. In such a case, disclosure of the profile 
to the members of the group may confront these individuals with medical information 
about themselves which they have not sought freely. It might even confront them with 
information about a risk which they as a matter of fact do not have. Of course, in 
situations like these much depends on the ways in which people are confronted with the 
information. Are they, for instance, informed about the methodical and methodological 
aspects of the profiles and risks indicated, so that they may conclude that they do not 
necessarily run the risk? Is it clear to those involved what kind of disease the risk is 
about? Nevertheless, in certain cases divulging profiles about health condition and health 
risk may confront persons with information that they had no desire to have. 
 
6.  From the protection of privacy to the protection of persons: practical solutions 
 
The problems surrounding profiling through data mining cannot be dealt with in ways 
similar to those in which individuals are protected against possible infringements of 
individual informational privacy. The application of principles and rights of, for instance, 
rectification and consent to potential infringements on categorical privacy is to a large 
extent impossible. Even if it were possible, it would nevertheless be unacceptable for 
obvious reasons. First, as has been explained above, the reference group of the profile 
will only rarely be able to reach and enact collective decisions because of its lack of 
organisational structure and personal or social ties. Second, if one were to turn from the 
group as such to the individual members of the group, then an individual’s possibility of 
refusal or of opting out could be harmful. It would be harmful to other members of the 
reference group as well as to the very person refusing to allow personal information to be 
used in producing the profile. For, actual refusal will reduce the reliability of the profile 
or generalisation. Nevertheless, all members of the reference group, including the 
 19
individual who opted out, are at risk of being judged and treated on the basis of just this 
profile with reduced reliability. Of course, the possibility of opting out may also, in some 
respects, benefit the members of the reference group. If, in the case of application in 
selection procedures, only people with bad risks actually refuse the use of their  
information this may turn out to be rather advantageous for the healthy. This, however, 
does not diminish the wrongfulness of, for instance, judging and treating persons on the 
basis of properties which they do not, if only with a decreased probability, instantiate. 
Perhaps then the only way to protect individuals against the possible negative 
consequences of the use of generalisations and profiles based on personal information in 
the broad sense lies in a careful case-by-case assessment of the ways in which the group 
profiles are in fact used and can be used. By meticulously investigating and evaluating 
these applications one may hope to find starting points for restrictions of the purposes for 
which the profiles are produced and applied. An elaborate proposal concerning such 
acceptable and unacceptable purposes cannot be provided here. It is important, however, 
to keep in mind that solutions will not be found only in forbidding the production and 
application of profiles for certain purposes. In many cases, it may be more appropriate to 
reconsider those purposes themselves. Sometimes it may be easier or even morally more 
desirable to do something about social and economic arrangements that induce wrongful 
applications of information technologies than abolishing those applications. This is the 
case especially where, for instance, profiles can be used for desirable purposes and for 
undesirable purposes at the same time. Also, in such situations where there is a possibility 
of good use and bad use of the same newly produced information, doubtless some help is 
to be expected from encryption and authentication techniques. It may turn out to be 
possible, for instance, to protect databases against certain types of queries, or to make 
certain information accessible only to certain persons for certain purposes. Together with 
agreements in the legal or contractual sphere, through which the behaviour of these 
persons is bound and can be controlled, technical solutions may turn out to be the best 
practicable solutions to the problems mentioned. 
 Touching on practical solutions, it should be noted that data mining can in some 
way complicate the problems that have been discussed so far even further. Data mining 
gives us the opportunity of producing profiles easier, quicker and in greater numbers than 
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was possible before the techniques, called data mining, came to hand. It also enables us to 
discover many more correlations between phenomena, such as characteristics of 
individuals and groups, than were known until today. For instance, data mining may 
show correlations between characteristics that are trivial in a certain context and 
characteristics that are significant in that same context. It may be possible to establish a 
statistical relationship between the ownership of a certain type of car, on the one hand, 
and a certain health risk, on the other (without there necessarily being any natural causal 
relationship between the two). If this were the case, then the use of the health-risk profile 
could be hidden, as it were, 'behind' the use of the profile of car owners. This is especially 
complicating in situations where we would not have other possibilities of controlling 
what people in a certain institution or enterprise are doing with profiles than to wait until 
an individual consumer or patient discovers what is happening and starts to complain. 
The possibility of linking significant, potentially harmful, profiles to trivial ones makes it 
difficult to uncover dubious applications.19 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
Our current moral and legal vocabularies and conceptual frameworks for dealing with 
information technologies should be revised and extended in order to adjust them to the 
problems that arise. On the occasion of problems relating to data mining and profiling for 
epidemiological purposes, I have suggested a reconceptualisation of privacy. In my 
account, the basic description frame of 'immunity to the judgement of others' is the 
unifying factor in the family of privacy conceptions, while the importance of privacy in 
different situations depends on contextual factors such as conventions, social and 
economic arrangements and technical developments on the one hand and a large set of 
diverging values, ranging from individual well-being and personal autonomy to fairness 
and individuality, on the other.  Practical problems relating to new technologies such as 
those lying at the heart of data mining urge the moral and legal assessment of information 
technologies to be no longer exclusively focused on privacy norms and related norms 
such as those of confidentiality. Instead, the scope of privacy norms should be interpreted 
more broadly, so as to cover a wider range of personal data than data relating to 
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identifiable individual persons only. In addition, the criteria for assessing the 
technologies in the field of medical information should also include norms of social 
justice, fairness and respect for the individuality of persons. Only by making these 
adjustments will we be able to understand the significance of the problems occurring and 
will we be in a position to solve conflicts between public-health interests and the 
protection of individuals and groups against stigmatisation, discrimination and violations 
of their dignity. 
 
 
                                                        
1 The research for this paper was partially funded by the Netherlands' Organisation for Scientific Research. 
Thanks are due to Peter Blok and Eric Schreuders of Tilburg University for their constructive suggestions 
and criticisms. 
2 Cf. U. Fayyad, G. Piatetsky-Shapiro and P. Smyth, 'Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining: Towards a 
Unifying Framework', in: E. Simoudis, J. Hian and U. Fayyad, eds., Proceedings of the Second 
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (Menlo Park, Cal., 1996);  W.J.  
Frawley, G. Piatetsky-Shapiro and  C.J. Matheus, 'Knowledge Discovery in Databases: An Overview', in:  
G. Piatetsky-Shapiro and W.J. Frawley, eds., Knowledge Discovery in Databases (Menlo Park, Cal. / 
Cambridge, Mass. / London, 1991). 
3 Of course, the significance of patterns is determined by contextual factors such as the aims of the analyst, 
the analyst's superiors' aims, their institutional environment, social and political situation, natural 
predicament ,etc. 
4 Anita Allen and Helen Nissenbaum have also drawn attention to the problem of restricting data protection 
to the protection of personal data, be it from other perspectives: A. Allen, Uneasy Access (Totowa, N.J., 
1988); H. Nissenbaum, 'Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public', 
(1998) 17 Law and Philosophy, 559-596. 
5 See, for instance, W.A. Parent, 'Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy', (1983) 20 American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 341-356; S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, 1988), 264-305; J.L. 
Johnson,  'Privacy, Liberty and Integrity', (1989) 3 Public Affairs Quarterly 15-34. 
6 See, for example: P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford, 1959); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and 
Morality (London, 1963); A. MacIntyre, 'The Privatization of the Good, An Inaugural Lecture', (1990) 52 
The Review of Politics, 344-361; and, more recently, A. Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York, 1999).  
7 J.J. Thomson, 'The Right to Privacy' (1975) Philosophy and Public Affairs 295-315; T.M. Scanlon, 
'Thomson on Privacy' (1975) Philosophy and Public Affairs, 315-322. 
8 W.A. Parent, 'Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy', (1983) 20 American Philosophical Quarterly 341-
356. 
9 C. Fried, An Anatomy of Values  (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); J. Rachels, 'Why Privacy is Important' (1975) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 323-333. 
10 D. Johnson, Computers and Privacy (Upper Saddle River, 1994) 81-102. 
11 J.L. Johnson, 'Privacy and the Judgement of Others' (1989) 23 Journal of Value Inquiry 157-168; 
'Privacy, Liberty and Integrity', (1989) 3 Public Affairs Quarterly 15-34; 'A Theory of the Nature and Value 
of Privacy', (1992) 6 Public Affairs Quarterly 271-288; S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, 
1988), 264-305. 
12 One should not say that privacy is an essentially contested concept. Gallie's idea of essential 
contestedness ultimately tends to suggest that essentially contested concepts are nonsense; W.B. Gallie, 
'Essentially Contested Concepts' , (1955-56) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167-198. 
13 For some methodology regarding the ways I expound en defend the conceptual scheme of privacy, see: 
A. Vedder, 'Considered Judgements: Meaning, Community and Tradition' in W. van der Burg and Th. van 
Willigenburg (eds.), Reflective Equilibrium, (Dordrecht, 1998) 55-72. 
 22
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 J.L. Johnson, 'Privacy and the Judgement of Others' (1989) 23 Journal of Value Inquiry, 157 
15 S.I. Benn, A Theory, n. 11 above, 264, 305. 
16 M. Hartney, 'Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights'  (1991) 4 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 293-314. 
17 A. Vedder, 'Privatization, Information Technology and Privacy: Reconsidering the Social 
Responsibilities of Organizations' in Geoff Moore (ed.), Business Ethics: Principles and Practice. 
(Sunderland, 1997), 215-226. 
18 J. Harvey, 'Stereotypes and Group-Claims: Epistemological and Moral Issues and Their Implications for 
Multiculturalism in Education', (1991) 24 Journal of Philosophy and Education, 39-50. 
19 Vedder, n. 17 above. 
 
Contact address 
Dr Anton Vedder 
Schoordijk Institute, Faculty of Law, U 31 
Tilburg University 
PO Box 90 153 
5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands 
Phone: ** 31 13 466 83 85 
Fax: ** 31 13 466 80 45 
email: anton.vedder@kub.nl 
 
Biographical Note on the Author 
 
Anton Vedder teaches ethics and is a research fellow at the Faculty of Law of Tilburg University. His 
research interests are: moral epistemology and semantics, value theory and applied ethics (relating to 
information technology and medical ethics). Recent publications include articles and papers on 
Wittgenstein, Kovesi and coherence theories,  on ethical aspects of data mining and on medical 
confidentiality. 
